THE CASE AGAINST BEN BERNANKE
By Stephen Roach

Barack Obama has rendered one of his most important post-crisis verdicts: Ben Bernanke will be nominated 
for a second term as chair of the Federal Reserve. This is a very shortsighted decision. While America's 
head central banker deserves credit for being creative and courageous in orchestrating an unusually 
aggressive monetary easing, it is important to remember that his pre-crisis actions played an equally 
critical role in setting the stage for the most wrenching recession since the 1930s. It is as if a doctor 
guilty of malpractice is being given credit for inventing a miracle cure. Maybe the patient needs a new 
doctor.

Mr Bernanke made three critical mistakes in his pre-Lehman incarnation: First, and foremost, he was deeply 
wedded to the philosophical conviction that central banks should be agnostic when it comes to asset 
bubbles. On this count, he stood with his predecessor – serial bubble-blowing Alan Greenspan – who argued 
that monetary authorities are best positioned to clean up the mess after the bursting of asset bubbles 
rather than to pre-empt the damage. As a corollary to this approach, both Mr Bernanke and Mr Greenspan drew 
the wrong conclusions from post- bubble strategies earlier in this decade put in place after the bursting 
of the equity bubble in 2000. In retrospect, the Fed's injection of excess liquidity in 2001-2003, which Mr 
Bernanke endorsed with fervour, played a key role in setting the stage for the lethal mix of property and 
credit bubbles.

Secondly, Mr Bernanke was the intellectual champion of the "global saving glut" defence that exonerated the 
US from its bubble-prone tendencies and pinned the blame on surplus savers in Asia. While there is no 
denying the demand for dollar assets by foreign creditors, it is absurd to blame overseas lenders for 
reckless behaviour by Americans that a US central bank should have contained. Asia's surplus savers had 
nothing to do with America's irresponsible penchant for leveraging a housing bubble and using the proceeds 
to fund consumption. Mr Bernanke's saving glut argument was at the core of a deep-seated US denial that 
failed to look in the mirror and pinned blame on others.

Third, Mr Bernanke is cut from the same market libertarian cloth that got the Fed into this mess. Steeped 
in the Greenspan credo that markets know better than regulators, Mr Bernanke was aligned with the 
prevailing Fed mindset that abrogated its regulatory authority in the era of excess. The derivatives 
explosion, extreme leverage of regulated and shadow banks, excesses of mortgage lending were all flagrant 
abuses that both Mr Bernanke and Mr Greenspan could have said no to. But they did not. As a result, a 
complex and unstable system veered dangerously out of control.

Notwithstanding these mistakes, Mr Obama may be premature in giving Mr Bernanke credit for the great cure. 
No one knows for certain as to whether the Fed's strategy will ultimately be successful. The worst of the 
US recession appears to have been arrested for now – a fairly typical, but temporary, outgrowth of the 
time-honoured inventory cycle. But the sustainability of any post-bubble recovery is always dubious. Just 
ask Japan 20 years after the bursting of its bubbles.

While financial markets are giddy with hopes of economic revival – in part inspired by Mr Bernanke's 
cheerleading at the Fed's annual Jackson Hole gathering – there is still good reason to believe that the 
US recovery will be anaemic and fragile. US consumers are in the early stages of a multi-year retrenchment 
as they cut debt and rebuild retirement saving. The unusual breadth and synchronicity of the global 
recession will restrain US export demand from becoming a new growth engine.

It would be the height of folly to reward Mr Bernanke for the recovery that never stuck. Yet Mr Bernanke's 
apparent reward is, unfortunately, typical of the snap judgments that guide Washington decision-making. In 
this same vein, it is hard to forget Mr Greenspan's mission-accomplished speech in 2004 that claimed "our 
strategy of addressing the bubble's consequences rather than the bubble itself has been successful". Eager 
to declare the crisis over, the Obama verdict may be equally premature.

The Bernanke reappointment is a welcome chance for a broader debate over the conduct and role of US 
monetary policy. Mr Obama has made sweeping proposals that give the Fed broad new powers in managing 
systemic risks. I argued in this newspaper 10 months ago that the Fed should not be granted these powers 
without greater accountability as required by a "financial stability mandate" – in effect, forcing the 
Fed to shape monetary policy with an aim towards avoiding asset bubbles and imbalances. Without a revamped 
policy mandate, it is conceivable that we could face another destabilising crisis.

Ultimately, these decisions boil down to the person – in this case, Mr Bernanke – who is being charged 
with the awesome responsibility as America's chief economic policymaker. As a student of the Great 
Depression, he should have known better. Yes, he reacted strongly after the fact in taking actions to avoid 
the pitfalls highlighted by his own research. But he lacked the foresight and courage to resist the most 
reckless tendencies of the era of excess. The world needs central bankers who avoid problems, not those who 
specialise in post-crisis damage control. For that reason, alone, he should not be reappointed. Let the 
debate begin.

The writer is chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and author of The Next Asia, to be published next month


我反对伯南克连任 
摩根士丹利亚洲主席史蒂芬 罗奇

巴拉克 奥巴马(Barack Obama)已做出了他在“后危机”时代的一项最重要的决定：提名本 伯南克(Ben Bernanke)连任美
联储(Fed)主席。这是一项非常缺乏远见的决定。尽管美国央行的掌门人理应因大胆而有创造性地实施异常激进的货币宽松
政策而受到称赞，但重要的是要记住一点：在为这场上世纪30年代以来最严重的衰退铺路的过程中，伯南克在危机前的所
作所为发挥了同样关键的作用。这就好像一位犯有治疗不当之过的医生，正因发明了一种神奇疗法而受到人们称赞。或许，
这位病人需要一位新医生。

伯南克在雷曼(Lehman)倒闭前犯了三个关键性错误：第一个、也是最重要的一个是，他固守央行应在涉及资产泡沫时持不
可知论的哲学信念。在这点上，他与他的前任——吹大了一系列泡沫的艾伦 格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)——立场一致。格
林斯潘认为，货币当局最好是定位于在资产泡沫破灭后来清理烂摊子，而不是预先阻止它。这种做法的必然结果就是，伯
南克和格林斯潘都从2000年股市泡沫破灭后制定的“后泡沫”策略中得出了错误的结论。事后来看，美联储在2001年至
2003年注入超额流动性的举措—— 此举得到伯南克极力赞同——在为致命的楼市和信贷泡沫铺路的过程中，发挥了关键作
用。

第二，伯南克是“全球储蓄过剩”主张的捍卫者。该主张为美国喜欢制造泡沫的趋向开脱，并将责任推给亚洲储蓄过剩的
国家。尽管我不否认外国债权人存在对美元资产的需求，但将美国人不计后果的行为归咎于海外贷款人，未免荒谬。美国
央行本该阻止这类行为。美国人用杠杆制造楼市泡沫，并用所获收益支撑消费，亚洲储蓄过剩的国家与这类不负责任的嗜
好毫无关系。伯南克的储蓄过剩主张，正是美国根深蒂固的拒不认错心理的核心表现。这一心理使得他们不愿揽镜自照，
而将责任归于他人。

第三，伯南克与令美联储陷入这场困境的市场自由派是一路货色。由于沉迷于格林斯潘“市场比监管者更明白”的信条，
伯南克契合了美联储的主流思想—— 废弃了美联储在流动性过剩时代的监管权威。衍生品激增，受监管银行和影子银行极
度杠杆化，抵押贷款过度发放——伯南克和格林斯潘本可以对所有这些明目张胆的不当行为说不。但他们却没有那么做。
于是，一个复杂且不稳定的体系便危险地转向失控。

即使不谈这些错误，奥巴马对伯南克“伟大治疗方案”的称赞可能也为时过早。没有人确切地知道美联储的策略最终是否
会成功。美国衰退的最糟糕局面眼下似乎已得到遏止——久经考验的存货周期导致了相当典型但短暂的增长。但任何“后
泡沫”复苏的可持续性总是存在疑问。只要问问日本在其泡沫破灭后20年的情况，就可以知道这一点。

尽管金融市场正因经济复苏的希望而飘飘欲醉——这在一定程度上，是受到伯南克在美联储杰克逊霍尔(Jackson Hole)年
会上振奋人心的发言的鼓舞——但我们仍有充分的理由相信，美国的复苏将是疲软而脆弱的。随着美国消费者削减债务并
重建退休储蓄，他们刚刚步入会历时多年的紧缩开支之旅。全球衰退不同寻常的广度和同步性，将会阻止美国的出口需求
成长为一个新的增长引擎。

如果为从未能持续下去的复苏来奖励伯南克，那可是荒谬透顶。但不幸的是，对伯南克明白无误的奖励是一种典型的仓促
判断，而这类判断指引着华盛顿的决策过程。同样，人们很难忘记格林斯潘2004年在庆功演讲中所宣称的——“我们应对
泡沫后果、而非泡沫本身的策略，已经获得了成功”。对急欲宣告危机已经结束的奥巴马来说，他的这项提名决定可能同
样的草率。

对伯南克的再度任命来得正是时候，它有利于人们围绕美国货币政策的实施和作用展开更广泛的辩论。奥巴马提交了影响
深远的议案，要赋予美联储新的管理系统性风险的广泛权力。10个月前，我在为本报撰文时主张，不应在美联储尚未承担
起更大职责的前提下，赋予它这些权力——这些职责是“金融稳定职权”所要求的，实际上是促使美联储以避免资产泡沫
和经济失衡为目标，来制定货币政策。假如美联储的政策职权没有经过改造，可以想象，我们还可能遭遇另一场破坏稳定
的危机。

归根结底，这些决定都归结到一个人身上——这里说的就是伯南克——作为美国首席经济决策者，这个人背负着重大的责
任。作为一位研究大萧条(Great Depression)的专家，他本应比别人更明白。没错，他在事后采取了强有力的应对措施，
来避免其研究中所强调的隐患。然而，他缺乏对抗流动性过剩时代最不计后果的趋向的远见和勇气。世界需要的是能预防
问题的央行行长，而非专攻危机后损失控制的央行行长。仅此一个原因，伯南克就不应被再度任命。让辩论开始吧。

本文作者是摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)亚洲主席